A longstanding literature has highlighted the tension between the altruism of physicians and their desire for profit. This paper develops new implications for how these forces drive pricing and utilization outcomes in healthcare markets. Altruism dictates that providers reduce utilization in response to higher prices, but profit-maximization does the opposite. Rational physicians will behave more altruistically towards poorer, vulnerable patients, and when the financial costs of altruism are lower. These insights help explain the observed heterogeneity in pricing dynamics across different healthcare markets. We empirically test the implications of our model by utilizing two exogenous shocks in Medicare price setting policies. Our results demonstrate that uniform policy changes in reimbursement or patient cost-sharing may not generate the intended responses on quantity.
I. Introduction
Economists have long emphasized the peculiarities of healthcare markets, compared to other markets for goods and services. Since at least Kenneth Arrow's pioneering paper on the subject, economists have recognized two features in particular: the altruism of healthcare providers towards their patients, and the reliance of patients on their physicians for information and guidance (Arrow 1963) . Less attention has been paid to the market pricing and utilization implications of these well-known insights into physician behavior .
Altruism encourages physicians to represent the interests of their patients. For example, an altruistic physician will tend to economize on the use of scarce inputs and attempt to maximize the utility of patients subject to their own resource constraints. However, the informational advantage of physicians creates a classic agency problem that physicians might exploit to pursue their own interests instead of their patients' interests. (See, for example, Blomqvist, 1991; Dranove and White 1987; Emanual and Emanual, 1992; Mooney and Ryan, 1993; Lu, 1999; and Zweifel and Breyer, 1997) . approximately 50% increase in annual physician reimbursement rates . Such large and sudden changes are unlikely to reflect changes in demand, but instead more likely to reflect movements along a demand curve. Price increases coincided with increased quantity in half the cases depicted, but with decreased quantity in the other half. 1 This pattern is difficult to explain when relying on either agency problems or altruism alone. Physicians exploiting agency problems would drive utilization higher in the event of higher reimbursement. Physicians behaving altruistically would drive utilization lower in the event of higher prices, part of which are borne by patients. What is needed is a unified approach that considers how altruism and agency problems interact to drive healthcare 1 The large majority of the procedures depicted in Figure 1 are major or minor procedures. Very few are lab test, imaging, or evaluation and management services. pricing and utilization. Significant policy questions are at stake, since price is often viewed as an important lever for influencing behavior. In some market segments, for example, higher physician reimbursements can be expected to curb utilization, while in others, the opposite effect obtains.
In this paper, we study how altruism and agency problems compete to influence price and utilization, along with the positive and normative implications of this competition. We rely on well-established models of physician behavior, but apply these to problems of pricing and utilization that have not been studied through the lens of physician preferences. From a positive standpoint, we show that exogenous price changes may increase or decrease quantity supplied. When higher prices lower quantity, we say dynamics are primarily "patient-driven," and when the opposite is true, we say they are primarily "physician driven." Moreover, the degree to which markets are patient-driven or physician-driven endogenously depends on physician incentives. Specifically, pricing is more likely to be patient-driven when patients are poorer, and when healthcare provision is less profitable.
In other words, physician altruism is more likely to win out when the value of behaving altruistically is higher and the cost is lower.
From a policy standpoint, patient-driven behavior limits the potential for overuse of healthcare resources, while physician-driven behavior exacerbates it. Thus, we expect less overuse, from the consumer's perspective, when consumers are poorer, patient costsharing is higher, input prices are lower, and profitability is lower. Increases in patient wealth, therefore, are expected to increase "waste" in healthcare, as are expansions in the availability of insurance.
Empirically, we test the conjectures of our model by using two exogenous policy shocks to Medicare payments: the 1997 consolidation of geographic payment regions and the 1999 change in estimation of practice expenses. Our results indicate that the size and sign of the own-price elasticity does vary when there is joint decision making between patients and physicians. We also show that procedures are more likely to follow patient-driven pricing behavior when patient income is lower, patient cost-sharing is higher, and the physician's price-cost margin is lower. We use these findings illustrate why uniform changes in payment or cost-sharing may not generate the intended responses in quantity.
Our main contribution is offering a theory that can identify when quantity varies positively versus negatively with price. The literature thus far has offered piecemeal explanations of the observed heterogeneity in response to price changes. Some empirical studies observe that higher reimbursements will lead to increased utilization, and the accompanying theory relies on physicians being profit maximizers (Clemens and Gottlieb, 2003; Gruber et al., 1999; and Jacobson et al., 2006) . Other empirical studies show that there is a negative relationship between price and quantity (Escarce, 1993; Nguyen and Derrick, 1997; Rice, 1983; and Yip, 1998) . Theories used to explain a negative price-quantity relationship include models of physician induced demand and non-fee-for-service reimbursement schemes. For example, Farley (1986) discusses implications of the target-income model. Ellis and McGuire (1986) demonstrate that having a prospective-payment system can lead to too few services being provided if physicians undervalue the benefits of patients relative to hospital profits, and Choné and Ma (2011) and Glied and Zivin (2002) discuss how managed care can restrict quantity. Finally, some studies find a low responsiveness between quantity and price, and they conclude that there is uncertainty in a physician's objective function (Holohan, 1977; Hurley et al., 1990; and Hurley and Labelle, 1995) .
We unify these findings by offering a simple modification to the existing theory. Unlike prior studies such as Ellis and McGuire (1986) , Ellis and McGuire (1990) , and Liu and Ma (2013) , our model allows physicians to care about patient health and patient spending.
This extension generates new insights on when services are likely to be patient-driven versus physician-driven. Our theory highlights that certain demand-side policies may be just as effective as supply-side policies in controlling costs. 2 This work relates to Dickstein (2014) , who empirically quantifies the contributions of patient and physician incentives to prescription drug utilization.
2 While policymakers have traditionally focused on controlling Medicare expenditures by altering Medicare payments, demand-side policies, such as changes to patient cost-sharing and supplemental insurance, are currently being debated (Gruber, 2013; National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, 2010; and Zuckerman et al., 2010) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we propose a theoretical framework for the joint decision-making between patients and physicians, and we derive the normative implications from our model. In section 3, we discuss the empirical approach for testing conjectures derived from our model. In Section 4, we present the empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.
Theoretical framework
Physician altruism and joint patient-physician decision making create unique relationships among pricing, utilization, and other economic forces. We demonstrate these points in a simple and standard theoretical model that traces back to Becker (1957) , and has been used by a number of health economists to study physician behavior (e.g., Ellis and McGuire 1986; Ellis and McGuire 1990; McGuire 2000; McGuire and Pauly, 1991) 
Simple illustration
For pedagogical purposes, we first illustrate in a very simple, perfectly competitive model how physician and patient decisions interact. Here, we presume that physicians earn zero economic profits, and patients bear the full cost of healthcare.
Suppose health is produced using a good or procedure , according to , where 0. We also suppose that this good is initially health-improving, but eventually health-reducing if overused. In this context, suppose for simplicity, that a fully informed representative patient maximizes the value of health net of the cost of production. This results in the following household production function for health:
max It is straightforward to show in this context that the derived demand for is falling in price , as in 0.
Now, however, suppose that the representative patient is not fully informed but instead receives care from a physician, who bears cost , where 0. The latter assumption rules out cost complementarities between the procedure and its substitute.
The physician maximizes a weighted average of patient well-being and her own income, as in:
The parameter is an index of altruism. With relatively minor modifications, it can also be thought of equivalently as the patient's relative bargaining leverage in a Nash-bargaining problem between patient's and physicians.
Observe that the physician's objective function can be rewritten as:
This has the following first-order condition:
Define as the second derivative for this maximization problem. This allows us to write the comparative static of the problem as:
If the problem is strictly concave at the optimum, then 0. As a result, if , the ownprice elasticity is negative, because the physician is sufficiently altruistic to weight patient preferences enough that her decision problem resembles that of the fully informed patient.
We call these "patient-driven pricing dynamics." If, on the other hand, , the opposite dynamics prevail: the own-price elasticity is positive. We call these "physician-driven pricing dynamics." 3
General model
The derivation above assumed physicians and patients are risk-neutral over consumption. It also abstracted from the existence of health insurance. To generalize the simple model, suppose the representative patient derives utility ; ), where is income, is an ex ante insurance premium, and represents patient out-of-pocket expenditures. For the bulk of the analysis, we assume that patients face some cost-sharing in the sense that 0, and in the sense that they bear costs when prices rise or . Later, we consider the polar case of zero cost-sharing. Here and elsewhere, we abstract from effects of physician decision-making on the insurance premium. This assumption sacrifices little generality in a public insurance scheme or when studying a relatively small set of procedures.
Now suppose physicians derive utility from a weighted average of patient utility and their own utility over consumption, ⋅ , where and are weakly concave utility functions. Physicians may also earn some non-labor income 0. Assume the physician utility function satisfies the assumptions of monotonicity, risk-aversion, and weak prudence, as in 0, 0, and 0 (Felder & Mayrhofer, 2011) . The generalized physician objective function can then be written as:
The first-order conditions now become: * 1 * 0
The optimality conditions are weighted averages of physician profit-maximization and patient utility-maximization.
To simplify the analysis, we follow the convention adopted in much of the insurance literature and abstract from the direct income effects associated with patient out-of-pocket payments (Lakdawalla & Sood, 2013 1. Physician altruism is higher -i.e., is higher;
2. Physician non-labor income is higher -i.e., is higher, which implies that ′ and are both lower;
3. Patient income is lower -i.e., is lower and thus ′ higher;
4. Patient out-of-pocket spending is higher -i.e., is higher and thus ′ higher;
5. The physician's price-cost margin, , is lower.
Intuitively, pricing is more likely to be patient-driven if: physicians care more about their patients (#1); physicians are richer and willing to pay more to purchase patient welfare (#2); patients are more sensitive to s pending growth (#3 and #4); and the opportunity cost to physicians of boosting utilization is lower (#5). Finally, note that in a zero costsharing environment, 0, which implies that pricing is always physician-driven.
Intuitively, even altruistic physicians have no incentive to worry about patients' financial impacts when there is no cost-sharing.
Finally, it is worth discussing the forces that move the slope of the equilibrium demand, . This can be written as: 4 1 1 In words, the responsiveness of input usage to price is equal to the marginal return to input usage divided by the second-order condition, . Above, we demonstrated that this marginal return: 1) Falls with physician altruism; 2) falls with physician non-labor income;
3) rises with patient income; 4) falls with patient out-of-pocket spending; and 5) rises with 4 The determinant is equal to 1 1 ′ . the physician's price-cost margin. Thus, holding the second-order condition constant, the same factors that make patient-driven pricing more likely also push the slope of the demand curve downwards.
Technically, the effects become ambiguous if movements in the second-order condition overwhelm changes in the marginal return function. Thus, it becomes an empirical question as to whether the same forces that make patient-driven pricing more likely also reduce the slope of the demand function.
Policy implications
From a welfare perspective, the degree of inefficient input overuse depends on moral hazard and on the over-(or under-) reimbursement of physicians. In patient-driven markets, moral hazard is relatively more important to address, while physician reimbursement is more important in physician-driven markets.
To understand these results, observe that Pareto-efficiency requires the standard input efficiency conditions, . Thus, we can characterize the degree of inefficient overuse by quantifying . By inspecting the first-order conditions for physician decisionmaking, we can derive:
This condition demonstrates that both moral hazard and physician over-reimbursement play a role in input efficiency. The overall degree of input inefficiency is the weighted average of these two sources, with the weights given by the relative importance of patient versus physician consumption. If physicians are perfectly altruistic, the overreimbursement effect vanishes. On the other hand, if they are perfectly self-interested, the moral hazard effect vanishes. In addition, note that increases in physician consumption levels place more weight on the moral hazard effect, because richer physicians place more value on their patients' consumption than their own.
The relative importance of physician versus patient consumption has implications for which policy levers are most efficient at reducing distortions. If the degree of altruism is high, reimbursements reforms aimed at patients will be relatively more effective. If low, on the other hand, reforms aimed at physician reimbursement will be correspondingly more effective. Put differently, policymakers should focus more on moral hazard in patientdriven markets, but on physician reimbursement in physician-driven markets. More formally, holding all patient and physician incentives constant, reimbursement reforms that compress will contribute less to efficiency when 1 ′, and viceversa.
Our analysis also has implications for global reimbursement reforms that affect many markets or procedures at once. The effect of price on quantity may be positive or negative.
Thus, uniform reimbursement changes -either global increases or global decreases in price -may have unintended consequences that depend on the mix of patient-driven versus physician-driven markets or procedures. Targeted reforms that change reimbursement for some markets, but not for others, might be dramatically more effective.
We return to this point in the empirical analysis.
Empirical Analysis
The theoretical analysis generates at least five testable implications:
1. Both the size and even the sign of the price elasticity may vary when there is joint decision making between patients and physicians.
2. When patient income is lower, price elasticities are more likely to reflect patient-driven pricing behavior.
3. When patient cost-sharing is higher, price elasticities are more likely to reflect patientdriven pricing behavior.
4. When the physician's price-cost margin, , is lower, price elasticities are more likely to reflect patient-driven pricing behavior.
5. Physician payment reforms have a larger effect in market segments where pricing is physician-driven than elsewhere.
Data
To test these implications, we rely on data from 1993 we have information on the price, including the co-pay, deductible, physician submitted charge, and Medicare allowed amount. 5 All prices are converted to 2010 dollars using the Current Price Index for medical expenditures. The CCF also provides information on patient diagnoses and basic demographics, such as age, race, and gender. We define a market-area using the Dartmouth Atlas' Hospital Referral Region (HRR).
The MCBS data consists of a smaller, but still nationally representative, sample of 12,100
Medicare beneficiaries. By combining patient surveys with administrative payment files, the MCBS data provides a richer set of covariates. This feature allows us to consider additional patient characteristics, such as income and education. Due to MCBS' small sample size, we rely on the CCF dataset when possible and use the MCBS as a supplemental dataset.
Medicare Payments and Policy Shocks
For each HCPCS, CMS calculates a payment based on three factors: (1) a relative value unit (RVU), (2) a geographic adjustment factor (GAF), and (3) a conversion factor (CF). 6 RVUs are procedure specific, and they reflect differences in the time, skill, training, and costs required to perform different procedures. GAFs are region-specific, so they account for geographic variation in the cost of providing services. 7 Finally, the CF is a nationally uniform adjustment factor that converts RVUs into a dollar amount. This factor is updated annually by CMS according to a formula specified by statute, but Congress can and has overridden the statutorily defined formula. 8
5 The submitted charge is the amount physicians bill Medicare. The allowed amount is what Medicare actually pays for the procedure, which is described in Section 3.2. 6 The exact formula for calculating Medicare payments is given by , where W indexes the work component, PE indexes the practice expense component, and MP indexes the malpractice expense component. GPCI represents the geographic practice cost indices, and CF is the conversion factor. 7 GAF is a weighted sum of the work, practice expense, and malpractice GPCIs. Details can be found in MaCurdy et al. (2012) . 8 The CF in 2013 was $36.61 per RVU. Congress has overridden this formula in 1998, 2009, and 2011. To measure price elasticities, we need to identify payment changes within a market that are independent of patient demand, technological change, and supply. First, we consider changes to the overall Medicare payment rate, which will include variation from RVUs, GAFs, and the CF. Since GAFs are set across several different markets and CF is one number set nationally, these two components of Medicare pricing are likely exogenous to the dynamics within any one given market. However, variation in RVUs may not be exogenous within a market over time. At least once every five years, about 138 physicians from the Specialty Society Relative Value Committee (RUC) and its advisory committee convene to re-evaluate and assign RVUs. Their main objective is to adjust the work component of RVUs to reflect procedural differences in physician time, skill, and training. If adjustments in RVUs are systematically correlated with demand for a procedure, then price elasticity estimates based on RVU variation may be biased.
While changes in work RVUs may be non-random in theory, the practical case for bias is less clear. The assignment of relative weight is complex and political with battle lines and alliances drawn between specialties (Eaton, 2010) . Deliberations are complicated by the fact that the size of the Medicare payment pie is fixed. As such, the final weights have been viewed as being somewhat arbitrary. For example, after the first major review of RVUs, the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) received "voluminous identical comments from family practitioners stating that [the HCFA had…] used an arbitrary method for revising the work RVUs" (Department of Health and Human Services, 1996). 9 Nonetheless, to address potential endogeneity, we rely on policy shocks in Medicare pricing as instruments for the overall Medicare payment rate. The first major policy shock occurred in 1997 when HCFA consolidated the number of geographic payment regions from 210 distinct payment regions to only 89 distinct regions in 1997. Discussed in Clemens and Gottlieb (2014) , this consolidation generated differential price shocks across county groupings within a state. While some states were unaffected by this policy, in about 26 states, the variation in reimbursement rates across counties was either significantly reduced or eliminated because multiple regions were collapsed into one single payment area.
While the first policy shocks affected payments across geographic areas, the second major policy shock created differential changes across services. Prior to 1999, practice expense RVUs (PE-RVUs) were measured using prevailing charges. However, Section 121 of the Social Security Amendments of 1994 and the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 mandated that PE-RVUs be determined by relative costs, instead of prevailing charges. Phased in over a four-year period from 1999 to 2002, the modified PE-RVU calculations, also better differentiated between the costs of performing a procedure in a facility setting-such as a hospital, skilled nursing facility, or ambulatory surgical center-and a non-facility setting, such an office or clinic. 10 We exploit these two policy shocks to generate exogenous variation in Medicare reimbursements that is arguably unrelated to the local demand for and supply of services.
Variation in these components over time is depicted in Figure 2 . Using data from Federal Register reports, plot (a) depicts the change in GAF among counties that were affected by the 1997 consolidation versus those that were unaffected. It is clear that much of the pre-1997 differentiation across counties was eliminated post-1997. Plot (b) shows the change in average facility and non-facility PE-RVUs across HCPCS over time. While the transition from charge-to resource-based estimations was phased in over a four-year period, the differentiation between facility and non-facility RVUs created a large drop in average PERVUs over time. As Appendix Figure 1 depicts, much of the observed drop in PE-RVUs in 1999 comes from changes in the non-facility estimates.
Empirical Approach
In our baseline specification, we use data at the HCPCS-HRR-year level to estimate the following equation for each HCPCS : log Q β log P Γ X γ η ξ t ϵ . (1) 10 Prior to 1999, the non-facility PE-RVU was simply 50% if the facility PE-RVU (Maxwell and Zuckerman, 2007 This assumption of exogeneity fails when, for example, changes in Medicare payments are correlated with the likelihood of performing a given procedure. Given the political nature of RVU changes, more popular procedures may draw a higher Medicare payment increase.
Alternatively, the exogeneity assumption fails when changes in payments reflect changes in cost of performing a given procedure. Although CMS uses the decennial census to determine certain indices, such as employee wage indices, it also uses the most recent retrospective data to determine other indices, such as office rental expenses. If costs are serially correlated, then changes in overall payment may be correlated with changes in costs. Furthermore, CMS updates RVUs based on comments submitted by physicians, health care workers, and professional associations and societies, increasing the likelihood of payment changes being correlated with other local supply factors (Federal Register).
We relax our assumption of exogeneity by relying on the two policy shocks as instruments.
In our main specification, we consider both the 1997 geographic shock and 1999 PE-RVU procedure-specific shock as an instrument for observed Medicare payments. Specifically, our first stage identifies the predictability of PE-RVU and GAF changes on overall Medicare payment changes within a market while controlling for the covariates specified in Equation
(1). Because the PE-RVU policy shock differentially changes reimbursements for services 11 An alternative to the HRR level is to use either the pre-1997 CMS geographic regions or counties to identify market areas. Results are similar when using both alternative measures.
performed in facility versus non-facility settings, we use the pre-1999 facility to non-facility ratio to generate a PE-RVU instrument that is independent of where a provider decides to perform a given procedure. In other words, the PE-RVU instrument for HCPCS in HRR in year is given by: * 1 * 1999 * 1 * 1999
where the and superscripts denote facility and non-facility components, respectively.
is the share of services performed in a facility setting for a given HCPCS-HRR-year. For post-1999 policy years, we use the time-invariant share of services performed in a facility setting using data from 1996 to 1998. The GAF instrument is simply the GAF for a
given HRR-year. The second stage uses the instrumented variation to estimate price elasticities.
Because Medicare payments are based on both PE-RVUs and GAFs, these instruments will be highly correlated with Medicare payments. These two policy shocks are also conditionally independent of other sources of change in quantity, strengthening the case for instrument validity. We discuss the other changes in Medicare payments in Appendix A.
Results

Prediction 1: Heterogeneity in Elasticities
First, we show that the size and sign of price elasticities may vary. Ordering HCPCS by their price elasticities, we plot the price elasticities estimated via OLS in Figure 3a and 2SLS with both instruments in Figure 3b . Table 1 indicates that only 4% of HCPC-estimates have a J-Statistic with p-value<0.10. In other words, for the majority of estimates, the p-value is large, and we cannot reject the null. Therefore, we rely on both instruments in subsequent IV estimates presented in this paper.
When comparing Figure 3a with Figure 3b , it is evident that the OLS estimates tend to be more negative than the 2SLS estimates. This is consistent with a story where higher costs, which are unaccounted for in the regressions, decrease utilization. It is also consistent with RUC showing preferential payment increases for less common procedures, perhaps because those services were considered to be undervalued. However, despite the differences between OLS and 2SLS, we cannot reject OLS as a valid approach. We test the endogeneity of the Medicare payment variable by examining the difference of two SarganHansen statistics: one where payments are treated as endogenous (i.e., 2SLS) and another where payments are treated as exogenous (i.e, OLS). 13 Unlike the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, this statistic is robust to violations of homeskedacitiy (Sargan, 1958; Hansen, 1982) .
Panel B of Table 1 lists the summary statistics for the p-value of the endogeneity test.
Because p-values are large, we cannot reject the use of OLS in favor of IV.
While we have provided evidence that both the size and even the sign of the price elasticity may vary at the HCPCS level, this exercise can easily be replicated at the market level. We demonstrate the heterogeneity in price elasticities by HRR in Appendix Figure B1 . In positive and negative elasticities among each category of service (i.e., major procedures, minor procedures, imaging services, evaluation and management services, etc.). 13 Under homeoskedasticity, this test is numerically equivalent to a Hausman test (Hayashi, 2000) . scattered areas across the US, increasing price reduces quantity, while in other areas, increasing price increases quantity.
Prediction 2: Patient Income
Next, we test the conjecture that HCPCS are patient driven when patient income is lower.
To evaluate the effects of patient income, we rely on data from MCBS and consider socioeconomic status more broadly. Panel A of Table 2 shows the sample means when dividing the MCBS samples between patient-and physician-driven HCPCS. The means are weighted by the number of times each HCPCS is performed, which accounts for the relative importance of each HCPCS. Panel A demonstrates that on average, patient-driven HCPCS are correlated with patients with lower incomes, fewer years of schooling, and a smaller likelihood of having employer-sponsored insurance. These conclusions hold true regardless of whether we split the sample using the OLS or 2SLS price elasticity estimates, and the difference in means between patient-and physician-driven HCPCS are statistically different at the 5% level.
To better identify physician-versus patient-driven behavior among, we perform a two-step estimation at the patient-physician-year level. First, we calculate price elasticities for each physician among different terciles of patient income. Second, for each tercile of patient income, we calculate the share of patient-driven physicians. If patient-driven behavior is more prevalent when patient income is lower, then the share of patient-driven physicians will be higher among the lowest tercile of patient-incomes. Specifically, for each physician and patient tercile, we estimate:
We account for differences in the intensity of services across patients by using the total RVUs consumed per patient as a measure for quantity. Prices are estimated as the average allowed charge per RVU. is a vector of demographic characteristics for patient in year , including age, CCI, and three dummies for being male, white, or black. Elasticities are identified off of variation across patients over time. In the second step, we calculate the share of elasticities that are negative and bootstrap for standard errors.
While only the MCBS dataset directly reports information on patient income, we also perform this analysis using the CCF data for robustness. In the CCF data, income terciles are defined using the median income of a patient's zip code of residence. The results are presented in Panel A of Table 3 . In both the MCBS and CCF datasets, physicians appear more patient-driven when treating patients with lower income. However, differences in the fraction of patient-driven behavior across income groups are only statistically significant when using MCBS' arguably more precise patient income measure.
Next, we consider how income affects the magnitude of price elasticities by estimating the following model for physician treating patient in year :
log RVU β log P α log P Z ϕZ ΓX ξ η ϵ .
Here, represents the log of patient income. In the estimations considered in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, represents the log of patient out-of-pocket costs and the profit differential, respectively. The coefficient on the interacted term ( ) identifies the responsiveness of price elasticities to patient income. In our baseline specification, we include physician ( ) and year ( ) fixed effects. We later add in patient ( ) fixed effects so that estimates are identified off of variation in a patient's income over time and variation in the physicianpatient interaction over time.
Results are presented in Panel A of Table 4 . All columns show that the interacted coefficient is positive, and most of the columns are statistically significant. The positive interaction term indicates that when patient or market-area income increases, elasticities are more likely to be higher, or more physician-driven. This finding presents evidence that the slope of the equilibrium demand ( ) rises with patient income.
Prediction 3: Patient Cost Sharing
Third, we test the prediction that HCPCS are patient-driven when patient cost sharing is higher. Because this empirical implication applies only to patients with non-zero out-ofpocket costs (OOP), we make efforts to identify claims where patient OOP costs are positive. In both CCF and MCBS datasets, we limit the data to claims with positive OOP costs. However, we cannot discern whether the patient or insurer paid those costs. Hence, we rely more heavily on the MCBS dataset where we can additionally exclude patients with Medigap insurance. Eight of ten types of Medigap plans fully cover Part B deductibles and copays. The remaining two Medigap plans cover a portion of copays.
Shown in Panel B of Table 2 , patient-driven HCPCS are correlated with higher OOP payments and higher coinsurance payments. The difference in deductible payments is not statistically different. This finding is not surprising because the deductible-set at $100
per year in 2003-is not HCPCS dependent. On the other hand, coinsurance payments are set at 20% of the Medicare specified-fee and therefore vary by HCPCS. OOP costs are defined as the sum of the deductible and coinsurance.
In Panel B of Table 3 , we use CCF to estimate Equation (2) using physician-HCPCS-level data. We examine three terciles of OOP among various HCPCS because the impact of OOP costs on price elasticities more likely occur at the service level, instead of the patient level.
The MCBS indicates that patient-driven elasticities are more prevalent in services with higher OOP costs. While differences in the share of patient-driven elasticities in the second and third terciles of OOP costs are not statistically different, the lowest tercile of OOP cost has a smaller share of patient-driven elasticities that is statistically different from the two higher terciles. The results in both Tables 2 and 3 support the conjecture that patientdriven HCPCS are associated with higher patient cost-sharing.
In Panel B of Table 4 , we consider the effect of OOP costs on the magnitude of the price elasticity. We find that the interaction term between log price and the fraction of payments which are OOP is negative, which indicates that when patients are responsible for a larger share of the physician payment, price elasticities tend to look more patient-driven. This finding is true even when controlling for patient fixed effects.
Fourth, we test the conjecture that HCPCS are patient-driven when the physician's pricecost margin is lower. This is equivalent to testing that HCPCS are physician-driven when the physician's price-cost or profit margin is higher. Because we do not have data on costs, we construct two proxies to measure profitability using the allowed amount-which is what Medicare pays physicians-and the submitted amount-which is what physicians say they should be paid. The ratio between the allowed and submitted charge should indicate the percent of a physician's charges that are covered by CMS. Alternatively, the difference between the submitted and allowed charges should indicate the shortfall or the remaining cost to physicians that they must "cover" themselves because Medicare reimburses less than their proposed charges.
The first row of Panel C of Table 2 shows that physician-driven HCPCS are associated with procedures where Medicare covers a larger share of their requested payment. The second row shows that physician-driven HCPCS are associated with procedures where physicians incur a smaller cost from performing the procedure. Panel C of Table 3 indicates that patient-driven behavior is more prominent in the lowest tercile of profits , and these differences are statistically different at the 5% level. Finally, Panel C of Table 4 , which looks at the interaction between log prices and log physician profitability, also shows that when Medicare covers a larger share of a physician's requested payment, HCPCS tend to be more positive, i.e., more physician driven.
One may argue that submitted charges are biased by measurement error as the charges physicians submit have no bearing on the actual payment received. While this concern may be valid, changes in the submitted charge for a given procedure over time are less likely biased. Thus, we approach this conjecture by administering another test. For each HCPCS, we calculate two elasticities: one that uses profitability changes above the median and another that uses changes below the median. Results are shown in Appendix Table B1 . We find that when changes in physician profitability are larger, HCPCS have a 0.06 to 0.09 higher probability of being physician-driven.
Prediction 5: Policy Implication
One of our normative implications is that physician payment reforms -such as reductions in reimbursement --will have larger effects among physician-driven HCPCS. To empirically assess this hypothesis, we rely on the 1999 PE-RVU payment change as our physician payment reform policy. We first establish whether HCPCS are physician-or patient-driven by estimating a price-elasticity using pre-policy data from 1993 to 1998. Because our instrument tends to be weak at the HCPCS-level, this first regression is estimated following Clemens and Gottlieb (2014) :
where Δ is calculated using the change in GAF from 1996 to 1997. Then, we run a second regression at the HCPCS-year level that examines whether the post-1999 PE-RVU shock led to larger quantity changes for physician-driven HCPCS. Specifically, the second regression utilizes data from 1998-2002, and we estimate separately for physician-driven HCPCS ( 0) and patient-driven HCPCS ( 0):
We utilize a seemingly unrelated regression framework and bootstrap for standard errors.
It is important to note that coinsurance rates are 20% of Medicare reimbursement rates, so it is difficult to separate responses due to a change in physician payments from those due to a change in patient cost-sharing. Our conjectures indicate that physician-driven HCPCS are positively correlated with profitability and negatively correlated with patient costsharing. Thus, it is important to be able to separate the effects of payment increases on profitability from the effect of cost-sharing. Focusing on the Qualified Medicare Beneficiaries (QMBs) can allow us to separate out these two factors. QMBs are Medicare beneficiaries who are also eligible for Medicaid, and they are not responsible for paying either the Medicare deductible or Part B. Thus, changes in quantity among this population will only reflect responses to a physician payment change. 14 14 Also in 1997, the Balanced Budget Act reduced QMB cost-sharing rates. Post-1997, states were only required to cover cost-sharing rates up to the Medicaid reimbursement rate, instead of the Medicare Results are shown in Table 6 . In Panel A, we consider all Medicare beneficiaries. In Panels (B) and (C), we consider dual-and non-dual eligibles. In all three panels, the response to a price change is larger for physician-driven HCPCS. However, the difference in quantity response between physician-and patient-driven HCPCS is most statistically significant among the dual-eligible population. 15 One drawback of the data is that it does not allow us to differentiate between QMBs and other dual-eligibles. For example, Service Limited Medicare Beneficiaries (SLMBs) are not responsible for their deductible, but they are still required to pay the copay. Because we cannot isolate QMBs from other dual-eligibles, the difference between Columns (2) and (3) will be understated. Note that column (1) is not directly comparable to the other columns because the identification of patient-versus physician-driven HCPSC is specific to the sample population.
Implications for Medicare price changes
Our analysis suggests that changes in physician reimbursement rates may not always have the intended effects. To further illustrate this point, we consider four types of Medicare payment changes and show their corresponding responses in total quantity.
First, consider a uniform 10% decrease or increase in Medicare reimbursements for all services. We use the IV-estimated elasticities from Equation (1) to calculate the change in total quantity when prices change by 10%. Depicted in Scenario 1 of Figure 7 , the percent change in total quantity is either a 34% decrease or increase. This finding is in line with the idea that on average, increasing Medicare reimbursements increases use, and decreasing Medicare reimbursements decreases use.
reimbursement rate (Mitchell and Haber, 2003) . This reduced the payments that physicians received, but it did not affect the zero cost-sharing policy among QMBs. 15 Estimates with an OLS second stage model are shown in Appendix Table B3. The results are similar in this  table. driven HCPCS and a 10% increase in payments for patient-driven HCPCS. Physician-and patient-driven HCPCS are again identified using the IV-estimated elasticities from Equation
(1). These policies lead to a reduction in total quantity by 52% and 17% respectively. This second scenario illustrates two important points. First, it is possible to generate a reduction in quantity by increasing the payment for certain services, namely the patientdriven services. Second, the magnitude of change can be much larger when the payment policy targets specific procedures.
An alternative policy is to target markets, instead of services. Scenario 3 indicates that a targeted 10% decrease in payments in physician-driven markets and a 10% increase in payments in patient-driven markets can lead to overall reductions in care. Scenario 4
additionally increases income across all markets. Changing income can magnify the total cost reduction stemming from a targeted change in prices across markets.
Conclusion
In this paper, we present a model of joint physician and patient decision-making. By examining how altruism interacts with profit-maximizing incentives, our model demonstrates that the quantity response to a price change can vary in not only magnitude, but also direction. We identify when HCPCS are likely to follow physician-driven pricing behavior versus patient-driven pricing behavior. Specifically, patient-driven behavior is more common when patient income is low, patient health care spending is high, and when the physician price-cost margin is low. We provide empirical evidence in support of these conjectures. The theory suggests two remaining implications that could be tested in future work: patient-driven behavior is more common when physician altruism is high and when physician income is high.
Our model also offers an important policy implication: physician reimbursement reforms that move reimbursements closer to the social value of inputs used will be more effective in reducing social inefficiency when pricing is physician-driven. While we do not structurally estimate the degree of social inefficiency in our data, we provide empirical evidence that suggests physician reimbursement reforms have a larger effect on physician-driven HCPCS.
The health economics literature has long recognized the tension between physician altruism and physician profit-maximization. Economists have developed an elegant and tractable model accounting for this tension. We exploit these tools to generate novel testable predictions about pricing and utilization behavior in healthcare markets. Our analysis demonstrates that the unique preferences and objectives of physicians creates pricing dynamics in healthcare that depart from those in other product markets.
These implications seem consistent with the data and provide useful guidance for policymakers and researchers. First, physicians are systematically more "altruistic" -in the sense of pursuing patient interests -when treating more vulnerable and disadvantaged patients. Second, heterogeneity in the effect of reimbursement changes is to be expected, and can be exploited to increase the effectiveness of reimbursement reforms.
Reimbursement reductions might be useful tools for containing costs when physicians are largely profit-maximizing, but they may be counterproductive when they are more altruistic. Being able to differentiate when a service or market is physician-vs. patientdriven will allow policy makers to more effectively target supply-and demand-side incentives. Notes: Data comes from the CCF. Each dot comes from a separate regression of Equation (1); elasticities are ordered and plotted. To account for the multiple comparisons, a Bonferroni correction has been applied; for both plots, only HCPCS with statistically significant price elasticities with p-value<(0.05/3,691) are shown. In plot (b), the instruments are PE-RVU and GAF. 
No. of Regressions 73
Notes: This table shows the IV related summary statistics used to estimate the statistically significant elasticities shown in Figure 3 (b) . Panel A shows the first-stage F-statistics when using both PE-RVU and GAF as instruments. Panel B shows (1) the distribution of p-values for the test that the Medicare price variable used in OLS is endogenous, and (2) Panel C shows the Hansen J-statistic for the test for the validity of using both instruments, instead of one or the other. (3) and (4) are statistically different at the * 10% level, ** 5% level, *** 1% level. In Panel A, the insurance coverage and education variables are measures of the fraction of patients with each characteristic. In Panel B, Any OOP is the fraction of patients who had OOP>0. Fraction OOP is the average fraction of total payments attributed to out of pocket costs. In Panel C, Fraction Reimbursed is calculated by the share of payments CMS allows relative to the physician submitted charge (i.e., Allowed/Submitted). The Shortfall is the amount providers bill CMS minus the actual CMS payment (i.e., Submitted-Allowed). Notes: Each panel and column represents a separate regression at the patient-year level. Data for Panel A is from MCBS. Data for Panels B and C are from CCF. † First reported mean is from MCBS; second reported mean is for CCF. The dependent variable is log(total RVU). All regressions include the relevant characteristic (income, cost-sharing, or profitability). Columns (1) and (3) control for patient's CCI, age, male, white, black, and year by HRR fixed effects. Columns (2) and (4) control for patient's CCI, age, and person fixed effects. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. * 10% level, ** 5% level, *** 1% level. ------
Notes:
The physician-and patient-driven HCPCS are determined using CCF data from 1993 to 1998 and the GAF policy change. Each cell contains data from a separate regression using CCF data from 1998 to 2002. The dependent variable is Log(Total RVU) and independent varaibles include CCI, age, race, and gender dummies, year, and HCPCS fixed effects. Bootstrapped errors shown in parentheses. Column (3) shows the two-sided chisquared and p-values for the hypothesis test that the elasticity estimates in Columns (1) and (2) are the same.
Figure 4: Effects of Counterfactual Price Changes on Quantity
Notes: Scenario 1 shows the percent change in total RVUs performed when 2000 prices uniformly decrease by 10% (dark blue) or uniformly increase by 10% (light blue). Scenario 2 shows the percent change in total RVU when 2000 prices decrease by 10% for only the physician-driven HCPCS (dark blue) or increase by 10% for only the patientdriven HCPCS (light blue). Scenarios 3 and 4 show the targeted and uniform changes by HRRs, instead of HCPCS. Scenario 4 adds a 10% income increase across all HRRs. The IVelasticity estimates, as shown in Figure 3b , are used to calculate the percent change in total RVU. Figure A1 shows the average work RVU over time for HCPCS that are observed in each year of the study period. After the RUC committee met to re-assess work RVUs, we see clear jumps in the RVU. However, with competing political pressures and physician incentives, it is unlikely that RUC committee changes are exogenous to local demand and supply factors.
The CF also experienced a major change during the study period. Prior to 1998, there were three different CFs: one for surgery, primary care, and non-surgical services. The CF for surgical procedures led to surgeons earning a 17% bonus payment relative to all other procedures. This generated political discontent and led to a budget-neutral merger of CFs in 1998 (Clemens and Gottlieb, 2013) . Plot (b) shows the CFs over time. After 1998, the CF for surgical procedures fell by about 11%, whereas the CF for non-surgical procedures increased by about 6%. We do not use this policy shock as another instrument for two reasons. First, CFs are constant across all geographic regions and all procedures, so their explanatory power for payment changes within in market area for a given HCPCS is weak.
Second, the shock in CF payments occurs mainly for surgical procedures, while changes in CF for non-surgical and primary care procedures are much less pronounced. 
